In this paper we examine the extent to which°uctuations in a number of macroeconomic variables impact on the volume of federal litigation cases. In particular, the impact of aggregate U.S. GDP, consumption, in°ation, unemployment, and interest rates on the volume of antitrust, bankruptcy, contract, personal injury, and product liability cases between the years 1960 and 2000 is examined using Granger causal analysis and vector autoregression models (see e.g. Granger (1988)). Our empirical¯ndings suggest that there are several linkages between macroeconomic variables and the volume of litigation cases, in broad agreement with thē ndings of Siegelman and Donohue (1995) , who¯nd that unemployment is an important determinant of the (number and) quality of employment cases¯led. Most noteworthy, we¯nd that there is a causal linkage from output, consumption and in°ation to the total volume of federal litigation, so that predictions of future litigation volume can be improved by using information contained in current macroeconomic aggregates. Causation in the other direction (i.e. from the volume of litigation to macroeconomic activity) is not found in the data, however. Additionally, similar results arise when examining the relation between various individual measures of federal litigation volume and the macroeconomy. Thus, the volume of federal litigation does not appear to be immune to the business cycle, a¯nding which is in broad agreement with the¯ndings of Siegelman and Donohue.
Introduction
In the case of commercial litigation, will declining demand and cash°ows make companies more reluctant to engage in this expensive activity? Are the reasons for commercial lawsuits somehow linked to the performance of the economy? For example, will intellectual property lawsuits more likely occur in an up or down economy? Will a rising economy create more innovations and more opportunities for parties to¯le lawsuits? On the other hand, does a weak economy force¯rms to seek opportunities within the legal system to replace diminished opportunities in the marketplace? Clearly, there are numerous questions one may ask with regard to the impact of macroeconomic and business conditions on the volume of litigation. Interestingly, with the exception of Donohue and Siegelman (1993) and Siegelman and Donohue (1995) , little empirical research into the above questions has been undertaken. In their empirical study, Siegelman and Donohue (1995) focus on a variety of questions, including testing the Priest-Klein model of litigation.
Speci¯cally, they test the relationship between economic°uctuations and the number of employment lawsuits¯led. Their results show an inverse relationship between economic performance and the number of employment cases¯led. They additionally show that recessions tend to generate lower quality cases, which the Priest and Klein (1984) model suggests would settle more quickly.
Our study di®ers from the Siegelman and Donohue (1995) study in several respects. Most fundamentally, we focus on a broad variety of cases, including di®erent types of personal and corporate litigation. In addition, our data set covers four decades while the Siegelman and Donohue analysis uses quarterly data for the time period 1977:2-1988:3. In a sense, our work can we viewed as an extension and update of the analysis conducted by Siegelman and Donohue, as we consider a longer historical period, include other economic variables, and apply a number of di®erent econometric tools. (However, as noted earlier, Siegelman and Donohue consider other questions such as factors that determine settlement.) In summary, our study focuses exclusively on modeling the incidence of lawsuits across di®erent types of litigation as a function of changing macroeconomic conditions; as re°ected in°uctuations in GDP, consumption, unemployment, in°ation, and the term structure of interest rates.
While the primary focus of our study is the impact of macroeconomic variables on the volume of litigation, we also study the impact of the volume of litigation on the macroeconomy.
One argument is that litigation is costly, causing higher production costs and therefore higher prices and lower output. On the other hand, litigation may be viewed as a tool for eliminating distortions, and as such will not have negative e®ects on the economy (see e.g. Shapiro (1991) ). Successful antitrust suits will reduce monopoly power, leading to higher output and lower prices. Further, with imperfect information, there may be economic bene¯ts to¯rms that produce unsafe products, and changes in the legal system may allow individuals to recover the damages resulting from use of these products. From this perspective, there is no reason why changes in the volume of litigation should have a systematic e®ect on macroeconomic variables.
Based on the application of a number of empirical time series tools, including Granger causality tests and impulse response function analysis (constructed from¯tted vector autoregression models), we¯nd evidence that economic°uctuations do indeed appear to have an impact on the volume of litigation. Most noteworthy, we¯nd that there is a causal linkage from output, consumption and in°ation to the total volume of litigation, suggesting that predictions of the future volume of litigation can be improved by using information contained in these variables.
Causation from the volume of litigation to macroeconomic activity is not found in the data, however.
Additionally, similar results arise when examining the relation between various individual measures of litigation volume and the macroeconomy. Thus, litigation volume does not appear to be immune to the business cycle, a¯nding which is in broad agreement with the¯ndings of Siegelman and Donohue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the data used in our study are discussed. Section 3 contains a summary of the results based on our empirical investigation of the data. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data

A. Dependent Variables: Measures of Litigation Volume
The various dependent variables measuring the volume of di®erent types of federal lawsuits were derived from the Administration O±ce of United States Courts. These data, shown in Table   1 and Figure 1 , feature the volumes of two very di®erent categories of lawsuits: commercial and personal litigation. The data cover the time period 1960-2000. These four decades feature highly variable economic conditions that include three signi¯cant economic expansions: the 106-month expansion of the 1960s, the 97-month expansion of the 1980s, and the longest post-war expansion that occurred during the years 1991-2001, which as of the date of this writing is 125 months long. is not a compelling reason why this data point should be excluded from the data set.
There was also an increase in antimonopolization cases in the 1970s which is apparent in the signi¯cant number of cases that occurred in that decade (see e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 458-471 Koenig (1998) and Pear (2001) . Defendants, on the other hand, may work to have a case transferred to federal court where they may believe that they may achieve better results.
Moral hazard issues aside, auto accidents and other injuries are presumably random. Are plainti®s more likely to pursue such actions in better or worse economic times? The availability of contingency fee arrangements may somewhat o®set a plainti®'s inability to pursue an action because he has lower income due to an injury (see e.g. Galanter (1998) and Kritzer (1998) ). Law rms are subject to the same economic conditions, but the income of plainti®¯rms that practice in this area typically comes from settlements or verdicts which may or may not have an obvious relationship with the business cycle.
B. Independent Variables
The macroeconomic explanatory variables include the broadest domestic economic aggregate, gross domestic product (GDP), as well as personal consumption expenditures and the civilian unemployment rate as a gauge of labor market performance. An in°ation measure, the urban CPI, and the 3-month T-Bill are also included. The latter has a priori theoretical relevance due to the fact that plainti®s' attorneys often access capital markets to help¯nance litigation. Therefore, it is useful to see if variations in the costs of capital in°uence the volume of speci¯c types of lawsuits.
These economic variables were all gathered from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED { see Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 ).
Analysis and Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis proceeds as follows. We begin by computing simple correlations among the total number of cases and each of the macroeconomic variables. We then perform Granger causality tests and ordinary least squares regressions, which are designed to determine which macroeconomic variables contain information useful for forecasting the volume of litigation. We conclude by estimating vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC) models, and computing impulse response functions, which describe the dynamic response of the volume of litigation following shocks to real income, real consumption expenditures, and the CPI. As a preliminary step, it is necessary to specify which, if any, of the variables are nonstationary, and if so whether any of the variables are cointegrated, as failing to do so may lead to incorrect inference and model speci¯cation. 5 Table 2 presents the results of augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, where the tests allow for a time trend in each series. 6 We conclude that only the interest rate series is I(0), using the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987) , while all of the other series are I(1). (For a detailed discussion of the unit root tests used in this section, see Said and Dickey (1984) and Hamilton (1994) ). Panel I of Table 3 presents the results of bivariate cointegration tests based on the EngleGranger two step method, with no cointegrating relationships being found among total cases, real GDP, consumption, and the CPI. 7 It is possible to have a cointegrating relationship which includes more than two variables, and if so there may be multiple cointegrating relationships among those variables. Panel II of Table 3 presents the results of full information maximum likelihood cointegration tests, using the trace type cointegration test of Johansen (1988 Johansen ( , 1991 and the lag selection approach of Ng and Perron (1995) . The results of these tests depend on the trend properties of the data, but when simple regression based tests were carried out, we found the preferred speci¯ca- Table 4 . In order to assess the statistical signi¯cance of these 5 See Hamilton (1994, pp. 557-562) for further discussion.
6 All tests are based on regressions of the form xt = ® +¯xt¡1 +
¢xt¡i + "t; where the number of lags, l, is chosen using the methodology of Ng and Perron (1995) , and the reported test statistics are the t-statistics associated with H0 :¯= 0, corresponding to the null hypothesis of a unit root. \Levels" results set xt = yt and \Di®erences"
results set x t = ¢y t ; (so that when x t = ¢y t ; the null hypothesis is that the series is I(2), while when x t = y t the null is I(1)) where y t is given in the¯rst column of the table. Starred entries denote rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at a 10% level, so that the interest rate is found to be stationary (or I(0)).
7 See Engle and Granger (1987) for a detailed introduction to cointegration in economics.
correlations, we employ Fisher's z test, with an asterisk denoting a correlation which is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 10% level. In°ation, unemployment, and the 3-month treasury bill rate are all signi¯cantly positively correlated with the total number of cases, indicating that the volume of litigation has tended to rise in the face of deteriorating economic conditions over the last forty years. Panel II, however, shows that there was little correlation among the di®erent types of litigation for the period 1981-2000.
The natural¯rst step in testing whether litigation is a®ected by the business cycle is to test for
Granger causality from the macroeconomic variables to the volume of litigation. Table 5 
where the lag length, k, is chosen using the SIC, and´t is an error term. In Granger causality tests involving stationary variables, the test reduces to a standard Wald test of H 0 :°1 =°2 = ¢ ¢ ¢ =°k = 0. is well-accepted in macroeconomics that it is di±cult for¯rms and households to index contracts perfectly to account for changes in in°ation or interest rates. Unexpected movements in in°ation or interest rates will increase the incentive for one of the parties to not comply with the contract.
Granger causality tests are useful as a means of uncovering a forecasting relationship between two variables, but it is also important to look at the underlying regressions and determine the sign and magnitude of the relationship. Table 6 presents the results of OLS regressions of the change in total case volume on di®erent variables, where an asterisk denotes an estimated coe±cient which is signi¯cant at the 10% level. Panel I shows that real income, real consumption expenditures, in°ation, unemployment, and the 3-month treasury bill rate all have signi¯cant explanatory power for total cases in at least one of the equations. Moreover, the signs of the signi¯cant coe±cients are consistent with the notion that the volume of litigation increases in di±cult economic times. Income and consumption have negative coe±cients when they are signi¯cant, while in°ation, unemployment and the interest rate all have positive coe±cients when signi¯cant.
As for the magnitudes of the signi¯cant coe±cients, we see that a one percentage point increase in real income or real consumption will be followed by a 0.75 percentage point decrease in the total number of cases the next year. 8 It is not surprising that the coe±cients on income and consumption are similar, given the high correlation between the two series ( Table 2 shows lagged e®ect, consistent with the Granger causality tests ( Hamilton (1994) ). One advantage of these models is that they allow us to calculate the impulse response functions for the volume of litigation following shocks to the macroeconomic variables. The impulse response functions predict the change in total cases after s periods following shocks to macroeconomic variables, i.e., @tc t+s =@" t ; where " t is an unpredictable change in one of the macroeconomic variables.
9
Panel II of Table 6 shows the results of estimating VEC models for total cases and the macroeconomic variables. 10 It is standard to estimate VEC models by including lags of all variables, and these results are presented in the¯rst column of panel II. The cointegrating vector, which represents the \long run equilibrium" relationship among litigation and the macroeconomic variables, is signi¯cant, as well as the lagged interest rate. As is often the case in such reduced form exercises, multicollinearity among the explanatory variables prevents many of the variables from appearing to be signi¯cant, and Table 2 , discussed above, shows that the macroeconomic variables are highly correlated with one another. 11 The bivariate regressions indicated that contemporaneous (as op-9 See Hamilton (1994, chapter 11) for a discussion of impulse response functions. 10 We do not present estimation results for the VAR models because the error correction term was strongly signi¯cant in each of the VEC models, indicating that failure to account for the long-run linkages among the levels of the variables will lead to incorrect inference (see Engle and Granger (1987) ). In addition, the estimated coe±cients in our VAR models were qualitatively similar to those based on a VEC model. VAR model results are available upon request.
11 Additionally, note that VAR and VEC models are reduced form models, in the sense that they are not designed to yield direct estimates of underlying structural coe±cients linking the variables in the model. Instead they can be viewed as models that yield the`best' predictions of the dependent variable, given all information. In this sense, the impulse repsonses reported on the the¯nal¯gure of the paper do have standard interpretation, and in the literature posed to lagged) unemployment a®ects the volume of litigation, so we also estimate a VEC model where lagged unemployment is replaced with contemporaneous unemployment. The second column of panel II reports results for this model, and we do see some changes in the results. The error correction term is again signi¯cant, but the unemployment rate is now signi¯cant and the interest rate is no longer signi¯cant. These results provide strong evidence that the volume of litigation is countercyclical, because several of the estimated coe±cients are signi¯cant, in spite of the existence of substantial multicollinearity between the regressors.
The multivariate regression models also allow us to compute impulse response functions for total cases. In Figure 8 , we present estimated impulse responses from a VAR model estimated both in levels and in di®erences (the VAR model estimated in levels will account for any cointegrating relationships between the variables, see e.g. Hamilton (1994) 
Concluding Remarks
We have carried out an empirical analysis of the impact of macroeconomic activity on the volume of federal litigation in the U.S. economy. Our¯ndings suggest a variety of strong linkages among the variables. Most noteworthy, we¯nd that there is a causal linkage from output, consumption and in°ation to the total volume of litigation, so that predictions of future litigation volume can be improved by making use of information contained in macroeconomic aggregates. Causation from the volume of litigation to macroeconomic activity is not found in the data, however.
are generally used as an alternative to calculating elasticities, for example, which require knowledge of structural coe±cients. , 1960-2000 (annual) Source: RY t = GDP, billions of chained 1996 dollars, SA FRED database RC t = Personal Consumption Expenditures, FRED database billions of chained 1996 dollars, SA P t = CPI-U t ; U.S. City averages FRED database U t = LHUR, civilian unemployment rate, SA FRED database R t = 3-month T-bill rate, secondary market FRED database
Notes: All variables other than U t and R t are modelled in logs, denoted by the use of lowercase letters. U t ; R t ; P t are averaged from monthly, and RY t ; RC t are \last quarter" of the year. Notes: Entries are Dickey-Fuller tests statistics and lags used in the Dickey-Fuller regressions (see above for further discussion). In the empirical macroeconomics literature, both unemployment and interest rates are sometimes modeled as stationary (so that di®erences are not taken prior to estimation of regression models), and are sometimes modeled as nonstationary (so that di®erences are taken). The reason for this is that unit root test results to date have provided mixed evidence concerning how to model these variables. Given this fact, given our evidence presented above that the interest rate is stationary and unemployment is only borderline nonstationary, and given that in theory a variable that is bounded above and/or below cannot be I(1), we model both unemployment and the interest rate as stationary in the sequel. -19.55138 -19.57381 -19.77368 -19.93845 -19.92149 3 -19.28462 -19.44412 -19.49780 -19.79361 -19.81897 4 -18.86543 -19.11544 -19.11544 -19.46334 -19 -18.59371 -18.51699 -18.64249 -18.78027 -18.58148 2 -18.17236 -18.10860 -18.22229 -18.30086 -18.19772 3 -17.56085 -17.59107 -17.60165 -17.76818 -17.75044 4 -16.79690 -16.87453 -16.87453 -17.05006 -17 .05006 Trace Test: Rank=1 Rank=2 Rank=0 Rank=0 Rank=1
Notes: All estimations are based on annual data for the period 1961-2000. In Panel I, the¯rst entry in each cell is the estimated cointegrating rank based on application of the Johansen trace test at a 10% level (all tests also¯nd no cointegration at the 10% and also at the 1% level). The second entry is the Engle-Granger cointegration test statistic (see Engle and Granger (1987) ), with lags selected as in Table 2 . In this test, the alternative is cointegration among the two variables, and the 10% and 1% critical value are -3.37 and -4.40, respectively (see e.g. Hamilton (1994) ). In Panel II, Akaike and Schwarz information criteria are given for vector error correction models with 0-4 included cointegrating restrictions. Starred entries correspond to the preferred model and cointegration rank. The¯nal row of entries denotes the estimated cointegration rank based on application of the Johansen trace test. The third combination of \trend" properties (i.e. linear trend in data, intercept in cointegrating relation) is the \preferred" combination (see above for further discussion). g. Anderson (1984) ), where ½ is the true correlation coe±cient, and r is the sample analog. In this test, a region of rejection at the 10% signi¯cance level is p T ¡ 3 jz ¡ » 0 j > 1:67; where z = 1 2 log µ 1 + r Notes: Entries in both matrices are rejection probabilities based on the bivariate null hypothesis of non Granger causality from the \From" variable to the \To" variable. Probabilities are based on F-tests constructed with regressions involving one lag, which is the preferred lag structure based on application of the SIC. See Figure 3 for a pictorial representation of these results. Notes: All regressions are estimated using least squares. Variable de¯nitions are given in Table 1 . In all regressions, the change in total cases is the dependent variable. Starred coe±cients denote rejections of the null hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero based on t-tests with a signi¯cance level of 10%. Table 1 for variable de¯nitions and data sources. Table 1 for variable de¯nitions and data sources.
Figure 3: Granger Causal Relations 1961-2000
Notes: This is a graphical representation of the results reported in Table 5 . The direction of the arrows denotes the direction of bivariate causality, with bi-directional causality denoted by arrows pointing in both directions. Notes: Plots show impulse responses for each of the variables based on estimated VAR models, for horizons of up to 25 years.
